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STATEMENT ^l .^SUES PRESENTED tUK KhviiiW 
Does the decision rendered by the Utah Court of Appeals 
• -. ih-- <v3so nr'jrroct ly intorprot the ] anguage of the standard 
in. .. • -. - - j • < , s.. . ] i in ] i 1 a t: € • t: 1 1 e i:e c o g i 1 i z ed i: i g 1 11 :> f 
- hu\.. r to seek specific performance? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. Nature of Proceedings 
The Division adopts the "Statement; oi the Case" 
< • , - n ' i : * i > « . - . • ;, 
Petition for VNJ j t oi toi tiorarj ^ " Bi , . in., ;.*M. Uatuie 
of t:ho Case" .jiui "Com so of Proceed! nqs" contained at pages 2 and 
to the extent, tnoso statements are consistent. 
_L 1- . Statement of Material Facts 
] T':o Division of Rea ] Estate of the Department of 
Commerce of the State of Utah ("the Division") is charged with 
administration and enforcement • • Ulat's rea; o:,tat- !••->, 
laws. Utah Code Ann. § oi ,. v^.i, is amended). 
2. The Static of Utah, through the Real Estate 
as amended), -n.o \iu: •• : ;( = Attorney General, has prepared and 
approved a standard from Earnest Money Sales Agreement for use in 
r e a J e s t a t e s a ] e s t: r a i I s a c !: i o v.
 t - . o 
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not relevant here, the State's approximately 7,400 licensed real 
estate brokers and sales agents may use only those forms approved 
by the Real Estate Commission and the Attorney General in real 
estate transactions conducted in this State. Utah Code Ann, § 
61-2-20 (1953, as amended), 
3. On or about February 20, 1987, First Security 
Mortgage Company, Respondent's predecessor-in-interest, as 
seller, and William R. Kelley, Jr., as buyer, executed an Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement (the "Agreement") on the form approved by 
the Utah Real Estate Commission and the Attorney General pursuant 
to the statutes referenced in Paragraph 2 above. (See Br. in 
Opp. at 3, paragraph 1; Petition at 3, paragraph 1) A copy of 
the Agreement is attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
4. Before closing a survey disclosed that there was a 
boundary discrepancy with respect to the property subject to the 
Agreement. (Br. in Opp. at 4-5; Petition at 4, paragraph 4) 
5. Also before closing, neighboring property owners 
apparently cut off the water supply to the property, causing a 
pond to dry up, thereby damaging the property. (Br. in Opp. at 
4-5; Petition at 5, paragraph 6) 
6. On or about September 22, 19 87, Kelley brought 
this action seeking a declaration of the parties' respective 
rights and obligations under the Agreement, specific performance 
2 
of the Agreement and damages for alleged breaches, (Br. in Opp. 
at 7; Petition at 9, paragraph 20) 
7- The trial court granted Kelley summary judgment on 
his claim of specific performance, and ordered First Security to 
convey the property to Kelley. The court reserved the question 
of Kelley's entitlement to an abatement of the purchase price of 
damages. Kelley and First Security then settled the damage 
issue, and final judgment was entered on May 6, 1988. (Petition 
at 9, paragraphs 22 and 23) 
8. Thereafter, Respondent, Leucadia Financial 
Corporation, was substituted as defendant for First Security and 
appealed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of 
Kelley. (Petition at 10, paragraph 24) 
9. On or about January 5, 1990, the Utah Court of 
Appeals filed its Opinion in this case. A copy of the Opinion is 
attached hereto as Exhibit "B". 
10. In its Opinion the Court of Appeals concluded that 
a buyer under the standard Earnest Money Sales Agreement could 
not obtain specific performance upon discovery of defects 
rendering title uninsurable, but was limited by the language of 
the Agreement to return of his earnest money deposit or 
acceptance of the property subject to the defects. (Exhibit "B" 
at 3) 
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11. On May 9, 1990, the Utah Real Estate Commission 
passed a Resolution, a copy of which is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "C", requesting that the Attorney General take such 
action and file such papers as are necessary to obtain review of 
the decision of the Court of Appeals, 
12, On May 22, 1990, Mr. Blaine Twitchell, Director of 
the Division, wrote a letter to David W. Lund, Assistant Attorney 
General- The letter requests that the Attorney General file a 
brief of amicus curiae on behalf of the Division, and sets forth 
the Division's position with respect to the Opinion of the Court 
of Appeals, A copy of the letter is attached hereto as 
Exhibit "D". 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This Court should reverse the decision of the Utah 
Court of Appeals because the decision incorrectly interprets the 
language of the standard Earnest Money Sales Agreement to 
eliminate the recognized right of a buyer to seek specific 
performance. 
ARGUMENT 
The Division is charged, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§ 61-2-5 (1953, as amended), with the responsibility of 
administration and enforcement of Utah's real estate licensing 
laws. Utah Code Ann. § 61-2-20 (1953, as amended), administered 
4 
and enforced by the Division, provides in relevant part that, 
"Real estate licensees may fill out those forms approved by the 
Utah Real Estate Commission and the Attorney General and those 
forms provided by statutes . . ." The Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement at issue in this case, was on the form approved by the 
Utah Real Estate Commission and the Utah Attorney General's 
Office pursuant to the foregoing statute. 
In rendering its decision in this case, the Utah Court 
of Appeals, interpreting Paragraph H of the Agreement (a copy of 
which is attached hereto as Exhibit "A"), held that when title 
cannot be made insurable, a buyer's only remedies are acceptance 
of the property with waiver of defects or termination of the 
agreement with a refund of the earnest money deposit, not 
specific performance. (Exhibit "B" at 3) This interpretation of 
the standard Earnest Money Sales Agreement effectively requires a 
buyer to waive his or her right to specific performance, and is 
contrary to the long established rule that "a vendee has the 
right to insist upon performance by the vendor to the extent that 
the latter is able to perform with an abatement in the purchase 
price equal to the value of the deficiency or defect," Castaqno 
v. Church, 552 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1976). 
This Court has consistently held that a buyer under a 
contract for the sale of real estate may specifically enforce 
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such an agreement. See, e.g., Eliason v. Watts, 615 P.2d 427 
(Utah 1980); Tanner v. Baadsqaard, 612 P.2d 345 (Utah 1980): Reed 
v. Alvey, 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980); and Huck v. Hayes, 560 P.2d 
1124 (Utah 1977). 
The Division believes that the Court of Appeals 
incorrectly interpreted one provision of the Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement in isolation, without regard to other relevant 
provisions contained therein. (See Exhibit "D") Specifically, 
Paragraphs "N" and "P" of the Agreement provide guidance as to 
the proper interpretation of the Agreement. For example, 
Paragraph N provides in relevant part that, "Both parties agree 
that, should either party default in any of the covenants or 
agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall pay all 
costs and expenses, including a reasonable attorney's fee, which 
may arise or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement, 
or in pursuing any remedy provided hereunder or by applicable 
law, whether such remedy is pursued by filing suit or otherwise." 
(Exhibit "A" at Paragraph "N") (emphasis added). The language of 
Paragraph "H", read in context with the language of Paragraph 
"N", illustrates the intent of the drafters of the Agreement to 
preserve a buyer's right to specific performance as provided "by 
applicable law." Id. 
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The effect of the Court of Appeals' decision is a shift 
in the balance of rights, remedies and obligations between the 
buyer and seller in favor of the seller. Such a shift was 
neither contemplated nor intended by the drafters of the 
Agreement, (See Exhibit "D" at page 2) Silence in Paragraph 
"H" as to the right of a buyer to specific performance should not 
be construed to exclude that remedy. Such a result is in 
conflict with other sections of the Agreement, and is in direct 
contravention of Utah case law allowing specific performance with 
an abatement of the purchase price. Reversal of the Court of 
Appeals' decision is particularly appropriate if, as is alleged 
by Kelley, the decision (and its consequent impact on Utah real 
property transactions) was made sua sponte, without the aid of 
briefs, oral argument or the raising of the dispositive issues by 
the parties. (See Petition at 13-17) 
Finally, Leucadia's argument that the Court of Appeals' 
decision has little precedential value because it is an 
unpublished opinion is incorrect. (Br. in Opp. at 29) While the 
Division recognizes the existence and effect of Rule 4-508 of the 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, which provides that 
unpublished opinions have no precedential value, as a practical 
matter, the decision indicates how the Court of Appeals would 
react to a similar situation in the future. Leucadia's argument 
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also ignores the fact that this Court could issue a published 
opinion upholding the decision of the Court of Appeals on the 
same grounds, and that such an opinion would obviously constitute 
precedent. The decision of the Court of Appealsf published or 
unpublished, therefore, remains a concern to the Division. 
CONCLUSION 
This case presents important questions regarding the 
interpretation of the standard Earnest Money Sales Agreement used 
by real estate agents and brokers in the vast majority of real 
estate transactions in this State. Because the interpretation 
given the Agreement of the Court of Appeals incorrectly alters 
Utah law regarding availability of specific performance, this 
Court should reverse the Court of Appeals' decision. 
DATED this ll day of Xfe%v> ^ K./"~ 1990. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
DAVID W. LUND 
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Attorneys for t\ 
Real Estate 
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EXHIBIT "A 
EARNEL MONEY SALES AGRE 71EN1 
Legend Yes (X) No (0) 
This is a legally binding contract. Read the entire document carefully before signing. 
m 
REALTOR0 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
(Sections) 
INCLUDED ITEMS. Unless exduded herein, this sale shall iocludt alt fixtures and any of the following hems if presently attached to the property: plumbing, 
g. air-conditioning and ventilating fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliances, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies 
>ds. window and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna, wall-to-wall carpets, water softener, automatic garage door 
r and transmitters), fencing, trees and shrubs. 
INSPECTION. Unless otherwise indicated. 8uyer agrees that Buyer is purchasing said property upon Buyer's own examination and judgment and not by 
i of any representation made to Buyer by Seller or the Listing or Selling Brokerage as to its condition, sue. location, present value, future value, income 
om or as to its production. Buyer accepts the property in "as is" condition subject to Seller's warranties as outlined in Section 6. In the event Buyer desires 
dditional inspection, said inspection shall be allowed by Seller but arranged for and paid by Buyer. 
SELLER WARRANTIES. Seller warrants that: (a) Seller has received no daim nor notice of any building or zoning violation concerning the property which 
iot or will not be remedied prior to closing; (b) all obligations against the property including taxes, assessments, mortgages, liens or other encumbrances 
/ nature shall be brought current on or before dosing; and (c) the plumbing, heating, air conditioning and ventilating systems, electrical system, and appliances 
be sound or in satisfactory working condition at dosing. 
. CONDITION OF WELL. Seller warrants that any private well serving the property has. to the best of Sellers" knowledge, provided an adequate supply of 
- and continued use of the well or wells h authorized by a state permit or other legal water right. 
. CONDITION OF SEPTIC TANK. Seder warrants that any septic tank serving the property is. to the best of Seller's knowledge, in good working order and 
r has no knowledge of any needed repairs and it meets all applicable government health and constnjction standards. 
. ACCELERATION CLAUSE, No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to closing. 
r shall provide to Buyer written verification as to whether or not any notes, mortgages, deeds of trust or real estate contracts agamst the property require the 
ent of the holder of such instruments) to the sale of the property or permit the holder to raise the interest rate and/or declare the entire balance due in the 
t of sale. If any such document so provides and holder does not waive the same or unconditionally approve the sale, then within three (3) days after notice of 
vaiver or disapproval or on the date of dosing, whichever is earlier. Buyer shall have the option to dedare this Agreement null and void by giving written notice 
tiler or Seller's agent. In such case, all earnest money received under this Agreement shall be returned to Buyer. It is understood and agreed that if provisions 
aid "Due on Sale" clause are set forth in Section 7 herein, alternatives allowed herein shall become null and void. 
5. TTTLE INSPECTION. No later than fifteen (15) days after Seller's acceptance of this Aqreement. but not less than three (3) days prior to dosing. Buyer 
I have the opportunity to inspect either an abstract pf thie brought current with an attorney's opinion, or a preliminary tide report on the subject property. 
:r shall have a period of three (3) days after receipt thereof to examine and accept. If Buyer does not accept Buyer shall give written notice thereof to Seller 
teller's agent, within the prescribed time period specifying objections to title. Thereafter. Seller shall be required, through escrow at dosing, to cure th< 
ct(s) to which Buyer has objected. If said defect(s) is not curable through an escrow agreement at closing, this Agreement shall be null and void at the optior 
\e Buyer, and all monies received herewith shall be returned to the respective parties. 
"I. TTTLE INSURANCE. If title insurance is elected. Seller authorizes the Listing Brokerage to order a preliminary commitment for a standard form ALT/ 
cy of title insurance to be issued by such title insurance company as Seller shall designate. Title policy to be issued shall contain no exceptions other that 
* provided for in said standard form, and the encumbrances Of defects excepted under the final contract of sale. If title cannot be made so insurable througf 
rscrow agreement at dosing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to waive such defects or encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and this Agreemer 
'< thereupon be terminated. Seller agrees to pay any cancellation charge. 
I. EXISTING TENANT LEASES, (f Buyer is to take title subject to an existing lease or leases. Seller agrees to provide to Buyer no later than fifteen (1 5) day 
r Seller's acceptance of this Agreement, but not less than three (3) days prior to dosing, e copy of all existing leases (and any amendments thereto) affectin 
property. Unless written objection ts given by Buyer to Seller or Seller's agent within three (3) working days thereafter. Buyer shall take title subject to sue 
;es. If objection is not remedied within the stated time, this Agreement shall be null and void. 
id ! Y«*<)Q -No(OJ EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
OATE :. •/r&zZu<f£Y ?-& /^^y^^^cl -
\e undersigned Buyer, 
kf\NEST MONEY_the amount of A 
e form of 
? 
S/JLL. fcrzt rv 
T 
srage 
[ f 4r*^f* \JT / 
— ' fl A>>—-ft 2* / ^ *^/4*^%Js>^6*~ s?^^ j»Auch shall be deposited in accordan 
f / y < ^ - £ j C * + ZC7S7Z Z W . . Received by (/ O ~ ^ 
*&>/- 6 HP- <k?S& [ 
i 
' Phone Number 
hereby jJeposits with Brokerage 
2 _ Oollars {%j&,G&<=?M~~y 
tnce with appltcable State. Law. 
I :
^ 
OFFER TO PUR tQHASE * 
T T T 
PROPERTY DESCRIPTION The above stated EARNEST MONEY js^given to secure and apply on the purchase of th£ property situated a 
sa^ J-S^£ " I in the City eW" i S ^ k & T y ' ' r y ^ t y 'of <~Tcss*f **'7~ 'urzik. 
ct to any restrictive covenants; zoning regulations, utility or other aasements or nghts of way/government patents or state deeds of record approved by Buyer 
sordance with. Section: G. Said property ts more particularly tiescribed-as: , : z z— • ~ 
HECK APPUCABUE BOXES: - -
I UNIMPROVED REAL PROPERTY C3 Vacant Lot O Vacant Acreage O Other _ 
I IMPROVED REAL PROPERTY . D Commercial . .^Resident ial OCondo qOther 
(a) Included heme Unless exciuded below, this sale shall include all fixtures ^ad any of the items shown in Section A if presently attached to the property. 
The following personal property shall also be included in this sale and conveyed under separate Bill of Sale with warranties as to tide: /rXz, / T / ^ ^ y ^ 
(b). Exdud^d hems. The following items are specifically excluded from this tale: 
<c) CONNECTIONS, UTILITIES ANO OTHER RIGHTS 
$ public sewer C& connected 
^septic tank ^connected 
pother sanitary systern 
Setter represents that the property 'includes the following tmprovements in the purchase pnce: 
Ppublic water reconnected 
jjrarivate water ^connected 
J-Xjwell ^connected Oother 
CB irrigation water/secondary system 
. 4S of shares Company: 
^BTV antenna Omaster antenna Dprewired 
^ .natura l gas f^cLconnecteoL 
^electricity ^connec ted 
pQjngress & egress by pnvate easement 
r^^ JD dedicated road^ O paved 
O c u r b and gutter 
. M o t h e r rights 
iS 
poor'to closing. ^ D shall-not "be-furcttshed (d)- Survey. A certified survey ^Sjshall be fumis^f"aT"tfie^expeV\s>r^>f^^^/-/- f\Zs. 
• (ej Buyer: Inspection Buyer has made a visual inspection xrfthe property-and subject to Section 1 (cj above and 6-"be(ow. accepts, it in -its present physic* 
condition, except. — — . — — — _ _ _ _ _ — _ — 
2. PURCHASE PRICE ANO FINANCING. The total purchase pnce for the property ts -~~<Zl^-^ - f^r-fl^^^i 
IFQ c?rsn 
c*— 
^ 2 ^ . 
_2l 
ollars j*\6o< & O o o — 
~r 
.) which shall be paid as follows 
which represents the aforedesenbed EARNEST MONEY OEPOSIT 
representing the approximate balance of CASH DOWN PAYMENT at dosing. 
pepresonung the approximate balance- of >an existing mortgage, trust deed note, real esrate contract or other encumbrance to be assume 
by buyer, which obligation bears interest at % per annum w<th monthly payments of * 
wh«ch incJude O principal. D interest. O taxes. O insurance. O con do fees O other 
representing the approximate balance of an additional exesting mortgage, trust deed note, real estate contract or other encumbrances to b 
assumed by Buyer, which obligation bears -interest «* . % pe* enoum with monthly payments-ol $ z 
wh*ch irvdude ^principal -Dtnterest . Ottxes; OiersucBoce:. 'Ocondo f«es* Oother. 
representing balance if any, including proceeds from a new : loan to be paid as. follows 
~jr<MS0 o 
£ i 
w jP70/v /fe & &Q& 
TOTAL PURCHASE PR.CE 8*Y**- " ' Z J ^ ^ r ' ^ 7? 7>*r 
(7/. o r / ^ 
me and £>-
i 
If Buyer ts required to assome en underlying obligation and/or obtain outside financing. Buyer agrees to use best efforts to assume end/o^ procure sa  i 
•r is made subject to Buyer qualifying for .and lending institution granting said assumption and/or financing. Buyer agrees to make application wtthm . 
fS after Seller s acceptance of th<s Agreement, to assume the underlying obl«oetion and/or obtain the new financing at an interest rate not to exceed — ^ 
3uyer does ncr quahfy for the assumpTion and/or financing wuh<n X /t days after Seller s accepiance of this Agreement thts Agreement sn^l be vo<d«b 
the option of the Buyer or SeUecupon wnnen notice 
Seller agrees to psy s 
:y<tupOf 
towards Buye< s total financing and closing costs. «ocfudmq but not l«m<ted to loar\ discount points 
—c rK- a<^ c.,moni-*-> nf mn #Ti« (nn loan or ob(<oai*on on tne on>Dertv S-oct«on F shall apply 
^ciVSXC TOmraCT- " • • - ^ - T ' C T f ' ." « c i„ - <. ^c . ^ 
rty-.**</tfject to encumbrances antt cxcept«ons n Serein, e*«denced b y J Q a current policy of tide in' zc «n the amount of purchase pr i ce /= \ a n abstract 
f o u g h t cuffed with an attorney's opinion (S* action H). 
• INSPECTION OF TITLE. In accordance with Section G. Buyer shall have the opportunity to inspect the title to the subject property prior to closing 
shall take title subject to any existing restrictive covenants, including condominium restrictions (CC & R's). Buyer Q h a s ^ h a s not .reviewed any condo-
m CC & R's prior to signing this Agreement. 
.VESTING OF TITLE. . Title shall vest in Buyer a s follows , s4* Ps£?dTr/> S'PAY* f£l&/£ To f^^,^<: 
SELLER WARRANTIES. " In addition to warranties contained in Sect ion C. the following hems are also warranted : 4S0si7£L 
cions to the above and Section C shall be limited to the following: . ^&A/£L 
SPECIAL CONSIDERATIONS AND CONTINGENCIES. This offeV is made subject to the following special conditions a n d / o r contingencies which must 
isfied prior to dos ing: 
Z__ZZI2ZZ 
; a reasonable location to be'designa'ted" by' 
. subject to Section Q. Upon demand. Buyer shall deposit with the Escrow Closing Office all documents necessary to complete the purchase in accordance 
his Agreement. Prorations set forth in Section R. shafl-be m a d e a s of gf date of possess ion f^date of d o s i n g ^ } other C-L. - • 
CLOSING OF SALE.* This Agreement "shall b e d o s e d on or "before. 
3. POSSESSION. Seller shall deliver possess ion to Buyer on dt'f^g . unless txxeadtd by written agreement of parties. 
3: GENERAL PROVISIONS. Unless otherwise indicated above, the General Provision Sect ions o n the reverse side hereof are incorporated into this 
sment by reference. - . . . - . . . . . . 
\ . AGREEMENT TO PURCHASE AND TIME U M I T FOR ACCEPTANCE. Buyer offers to purchase the property on the above terms and conditions. Seller 
have.until iiu . to accept this offer. Unless accepted, this offer shall lapse and the Agent shall return the 
itufe* 
TWi XT* Signature of Buyer Date 
:K"ONE " - . 
CEPTANCE OF.OFFER.TO PURCHASE: Se l l er hereby-ACCEPTS the foregoing offer on the terms and conditions specified above . 
JECTION. Seller hereby REJECTS the foregoing of fer .^- • — "(Scim 'simtialsj 
JUNTEROFFER. Seller hereby accepts the foregoing offer-SUBd£CT.TO the- exceptions or-modifications a s specified below or y\ t h £ attached Addendum, and 
rsems said, COUNTER-OFFER for Buyer's acceptance.-Buyer .-shall, have-until St?'*4 ( A . M . r T ^ Q . ? ^ o l - 19 < £ _ Z _ to accept .the. terms 
eofied below. Jtr ^ <jj* , / / ' S? / J J r - " 
~p- t 
V~-2; fy — £ ' o ^ c z*cu^ uJ^-^*j I ' ^ c a ' J^ : £? ^^
c<_ ^ /^r 'rs^f^^it- f*"^l 
Signature of Seller Signature of Seller 
CK ONE: 
uyer accepts the counter offer 
uyer accepts with mocVficatioos on 
e IS4 }Q (AM.PM) 
attached addendum A \ 7 ^ fl f/ 
S«gaaiurc of Buyer^ 2 S*goature of Buyer 
COMMISSION*\The undersigrved hereby agrees to pay tir _^ :^r^ __(£rokerace 
>mm<sSiOn nf ' / ^ * g . as consideration for the efforts in procunng a buyer. 
nature of Setfer 
Z.^c'-^l. 
lOate SignatAjre of Seller Oat 
• " OOCUMENT RECEIPT 
State Law requires Broker to furnish Buyer a(>d Seller wtth copies of this-Agreement bearing all signatures. (One of the follow<ng elternetrves must therefor 
^omple:ed). 
A J3^ acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing Agreement bearing all signatures: 
NATURE OF SELLER S I Q N A U ^ E OF BUXEri? | S 
Oate z 
%u, -? ? i 
Date 
Oate 
6 n / rvrsorvalfv caused a final coov'of the foreoo«oo Aoreement bearmq ad signatures to be ma<(ed on . 
Oate 
19 . 
AUTHORITY OF SIGNATORS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate, or other entity, the person executing this A g r ^ ^ ^ -
warrants his or her authority to do so and to bind Buyer or Seller. 
COMPLETE AGREEMENT — NO VERBAL AGREEMENTS. This instrument constitutes the entire Agreement between the parties and supersed and 
any and all prior negotiations, representations, warranties, understandings or agreements between the parties. There are no verbal agreements which mod'fv 
l this agreement. This Agreement cannot be changed except by mutual written agreement of the parties. 
COUNTER OFFERS. Any counter offer made by Seller or Buyer shad be in writing and. H attached hereto, shall incorporate all the provisions of this 
tent not expressly modified or txdud^d thertio. ' 
DEFAULT/tNTERPLEAOER AND ATTORNEY'S FEES. In the event of default by Buyer. Seller may elect to either retain the earnest money as liquidated 
•s or to institute suit to enforce any rights of Seller. In the event of defauft by Seller, or if this sale fails to dose because of the nonsatisfaction of any 
condition or contingency to which the sale is subject pursuant to this Agreement (other than by virtue of any default by Buyer), the earnest money deposit 
; returned to Buyer. Both parties agree that should either party default in any of the covenants or agreements herein contained, the defaulting party shall 
costs and expenses, induding a rtzsooMbte attorney's fee. which may Brlst or accrue from enforcing or terminating this Agreement or in pursuing any 
' provided hereunder or by applicable law. whether such remedy h pursued by filing suit or otherwise. In the event the principal broker holding the earnest 
deposit is required to file an interpleader action in court to resolve a dispute over the earnest money deposit referred to herein, the Buyer and Seller 
re the prindpal broker to draw from the earnest money deposit an amount necessary to advance the costs of bringing the interpleader action. The amount 
«it remaining after advancing those costs shall be interpleaded into court in accordance with state law. The Buyer and Seller further agree that the defaulting 
lall pay the court costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by the principal broker in bringing such action. 
ABROGATION. Execution of a final real estate contract if any. shall abrogate this Agreement 
RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the property shall be borne by the Seller until dosing. In the event there is loss or damage to the property 
n the date hereof and the date of dosing, by reason of fire, vandalism, flood, earthquake, or acts of God. and the cost to repair such damage shall exceed 
rcent (10%) of the purchase price of the property. Buyer may. at his option either proceed with this transaction rf Seller agrees in writing to repair or 
i damaged property prior to dosing, or dedare this Agreement null and void. If damage to property is less than ten percent (10%) of the purchase price 
tiler agrees in writing to repair or replace and does actually repair and replace damaged property prior to closing, this transaction shall proceed as agreed. 
T I M E IS OF ESSENCE—UNAVOIDABLE OELAY. In the event that this sale cannot be dosed by the date provided herein due to interruption of transport 
. fire, flood, extreme weather, governmental regulations, acts of God. or similar occurrences beyond the control of Buyer or Seller, then the dosing date shall 
tnded seven (7) days beyond cessation of such condition, but in no event more than thirty (30) days beyond the dosing date provided herein. Thereafter. 
; of the essence. This provision rebates only to the extension of dosing date. "Closing" shall mean the date on which all necessary instruments are signed 
slivered by all parties to the transaction. 
CLOSING COSTS. Seller and Buyer shall each pay one-half (1 / 2 ) of the escrow closing fee. unless otherwise required by the lending institution. Costs 
•iding title insurance or an abstract brought current shall be paid by^elleTTTaxes and assessments for the current year, insurance, if acceptable to the Buyer, 
and interest on assumed obligations shall be prorated 9S set forth in Section 8 . Unearned deposits on tenancies and remaining mongage or other reserves 
>e assigned to Buyer at dosing. 
REAL PROPERTY CONVEYANCING. If this agreement is for conveyance of fee title, title shall be conveyed by warranty deed free of defects other than 
excepted herein. If this Agreement is for sale or transfer of a Seller's interest under an existing real estate contract. Seller may transfer by either (a) spedal 
-vty deed, containing Seller's assignment of said contract in form sufficient to convey after acquired title or (b) by a new real estate contract incorporating the 
xisting real estate contract therein. 
AGENCY DISCLOSURE. Selling Brokerage may have entered into an agreement to represent the Seller. 
BROKERAGE. For purposes of this Agreement any references to the term "Brokerage" shall mean the respective listing or selling real estate office. 
DAYS. For purposes of this Agreement, any references to the term "days" shall mean business or working days exclusive of legal holidays 
E FOUR OF A FOUR PAGE FORM. THIS FORM HAS BEEN APPROVED BY THE UTAH REAL ESTATE COMMISSION' 
A JENDUM/COUNTEROFFE. 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AGREEMENT 
Th<s AODENOUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes (Y) a C O U N T E R OFFER ( J an A O O E N O U M to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the . day of firfarx i n r ^ y iQ Ptf between i Q ( ( ! I H f l D 
Q \(e\\e\i
 r y r . as buyer (s). and F i r s 4 l ^ C C u r < 4 : y O D n k . H i - f j - t m h as seUer(s). 
covering real property described as foHows: 
OMmm't-fcCoiifVT-y, U-Ln^ 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT: 
by SeUfry u.nfh T°?o inf^rEsf-ont\ / paymen ts 
,r^ _ d u r \r\ -Ai( I ^ mnnt i 
pr f -p^ynnpn-r r p F / W 4 - y - f c r P?n r f y 
fty ^eufry u.ntin / ^ /o tnt-j=resr o n l y p n y r m n r s 
(Ognr f fdy pad ioQlno^e d u g \ o -A id 9 moo^h^frnrn 
£S2rrxjQ. /VJQ prg-ppymen-b prnnt-fcy -fcr £?nrfy 
pny-OrT o f 4-hi's nofg.. i-onn-fe^-r-o bf. one, p r r rg r i i o f 
a.Oln^t'n^ -T-O IQF nn r^r hrTrarr. Ars^l ^ n , iQftV 
3, Current rerh'fieVj survey mi l l bf. prov ided toy .SepF.^ " 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same t ^ t S e l l e p < ) _ B u y e r shall have until .*? '.ClC) (i*r+rt-/P.M.) 
M )Or<l Y~\ ^ 1 9 ^ X to accept the terms specified above. Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse 
D a t e . Signature of (^{) Setter ( ) Buyer 
T.me 5'GD - <*-R1./P.M.) A^MTt C < ^ W ^ / , T ~ / ^ 
ii^Z^^Z 
ACCEPTANCE .COUNTEROFFER REJECTION 
Check One 
( /s j 1 hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above 
I ) I hereby ACCEPT the foreacyno SU6JECT T O the exceptions shown on the attached Acdendum 
S'$ni(Uft / / " ^ Signature Dste Time 
( ) ( hereby reject the f o r e g o ^ (Initials) 
DOCUMENT RECEIPT 
0 \ J I acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures 
'/L->t -A, 
Signeturc c( Buyers} jf . , \ 0<are S^gnai^e o' S€"e«si D^te 
( J ( personally caused a f/nai cop£ of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be ma<<ed on / ^ o y <~* ' J-—^.. 
^S„x / . by Certifiers ^ai( and return receipt attached hereto to the ( V ) Se<<er ( ) Buyer 
EXHIBIT "B" 
F I L E D 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
OOOoo 
William R. Kelley, Jr., 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
v. 
Leucadia Financial Corporation/ 
a Delaware corporation. 
Defendant and Appellant* 
JAN. • 5 1990 
\ ot thm Coon 
OPINION 
(Not For Publication) 
Case No- 880534-CA 
Third District Court/ Summit County 
The Honorable Pat B. Brian 
Attorneys: John A. Snow and Kathryn H. Snedaker/ Salt Lake 
City/ for Appellant 
David R. Olsen/ Charles P. Sampson/ and Claudia F, 
Berry, Salt Lake City, for Respondent 
Before Judges Davidson, Bench/ and Jackson* 
JACKSON/ Judge: 
Leucadia Financial Corporation (Leucadia)* appeals a 
summary judgment decree of specific performance requiring it to 
convey real property to respondent (Kelley) pursuant to a sales 
agreement. The lower court reserved Kelley*s damages as an 
issue to be tried/ but the parties settled that issue out of 
court prior to the appeal. We reverse. 
The issues we must decide are (1) whether the parties' 
sales agreement provides remedies to Kelley if Leucadia is 
unable to convey marketable title, and (2) whether those 
remedies require conveyance by Leucadia if title is not 
marketable. 
1. During the proceedings below, Leucadia succeeded to the 
interest of the original seller. First Security Mortgage 
Company. For simplicity, we will refer to Leucadia as the 
seller. 
The property contemplated by the parties in their sales 
agreement was not surveyed until after the parties executed 
that agreement. The survey revealed that Leucadia*s property 
description did not include certain acreage containing a 
stream, a pond, and a spring, all of which the parties had 
believed to be part of their agreement. Leucadia was unable to 
resolve the land description problem by negotiating with the 
adjoining property owner. Thereafter/ Leucadia initiated 
litigation against the adjoining owner and then decided it was 
not worth prosecuting. While Leucadia was trying to clear 
title to the disputed land and water rights, the parties in the 
instant action extended their closing date. Later, each of the 
parties maneuvered to obtain remedies which each believed to 
flow from their contract• 
Leucadia offered to convey title subject to the defects 
or to return Kelley*s earnest money deposit. Kelley tendered a 
portion of the agreed purchase price and insisted that Leucadia 
clear title and then convey the property. Simultaneously, 
Kelley filed suit for (1) a declaratory judgment of the 
parties' rights under the terms of the contract, and (2) 
specific performance pursuant to the contract terms, as 
declared. 
The lower court implicitly interpreted the contract as 
not providing an agreed remedy in the event Leucadia could not 
convey clear and marketable title to all the property. 
Judgment was entered for an equitable remedy, i.e., specific 
performance, with an abatement of the purchase price to 
follow. Thus, the lower court interpreted the parties' 
agreement as a matter of law, not determined by extrinsic 
evidence of intent. We accord that construction no particular 
weight and review the determination under a correctness 
standard. &££ Kimball v. Campbell, 699 P.2d 714, 716 (Utah 
1985). Whether ambiguity exists in a contract is also a 
question of law. Faulkner v, Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 
(Utah 1983). "We find, as r matter of law, no ambiguity in the 
agreement concerning the rights and remedies of the parties in 
the event title was found to be defective and unmarketable. 
A cardinal principle of contract law is that, in the 
absence of fraud or mutual mistake, a clear and unambiguous 
contract must be enforced according to its terms. Fast v, 
Kahan, 206 Kan. 682, 481 P.2d 958, 961 (1971). The terms of 
the contract, where clear and unambiguous, are conclusive. 
Goodman v. Newzona Inv. Co,. 101 Ariz. 470, 421 P.2d 318, 320 
(1966). The first source of inquiry is the written document 
itself. Bio Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt Lake Citv 
Corp,, 740 P.2d 1357, 1359 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). Thus, we turn 
to the terms to which these parties agreed. 
.Leucadia agreed "to furnish good and marketable title to 
the property," subject to encumbrances and exceptions noted in 
the contract. Paragraph G (Title Inspection) of the agreement 
provided a title inspection procedure prior to closing, 
including how the parties would deal with any title defect that 
appeared: *If said defect is not curable through an escrow 
agreement at closing, this agreement shall be null and void at 
the option of the buyer, and all monies received herewith shall 
be returned to the respective parties." Kelley refused to 
accept this option. The parties agreed that title insurance 
would be utilized for closing. Paragraph 4 (Title Insurance) 
of the agreement provided the procedure for insuring title: 
"If title cannot be made insurable through an escrow agreement 
at closing, the earnest money shall, unless Buyer elects to 
waive such defects and encumbrances, be refunded to Buyer, and 
this agreement shall thereupon be terminated." Title could not 
be made insurable without exceptions for defects. Kelley 
refused to waive the defects, thus his remedy, as agreed; was 
limited to a refund of his earnest money deposit, not specific 
performance. 
We have examined the other issues argued by the parties, 
including that of tender,2 and conclude they are meritless or 
that they do not require our consideration in light of the 
clear and unambiguous terms of the parties* agreement.3 
2. This court recently discussed the requirement of tender, 
where a purchase agreement contemplates simultaneous 
performance by the parties, in Bell v. Elder, 121 Utah Adv. 
Rep, 16 (Ct. App. 1989), ai. . Carr v. Enoch Smith Co., 119 Utah 
Adv. Rep. 89 (Ct. App. 1989). See also. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78-27-1 (1987). 
3. In its brief, Leucadia touched on a related issue of 
vandalism, believed to have been committed by the adjoining 
landowner, which diverted the water and dried up the pond. 
Paragraph P (Risk of Loss) of the parties' agreement provided a 
procedure for dealing with loss or damage to the property prior 
to closing. Kelley did not seek to use that procedure. 
The judgment of the trial court is reversed, and the case 
is remanded for entry of judgment consistent with this opinion. 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
BENCH, Judge (dissenting): 
The main opinion reverses this judgment because there is 
no contractual provision allowing for specific performance. If 
Kelley made a proper and timely tender of payment, I believe 
the remedy of specific performance is available. 
My colleagues are correct in limiting the parties' 
remedies at law to the terms of the contract. If there was a 
"defect* in Leucadia«s title, the contract permits Kelley to: 
1) waive the defect and go through with the purchase; or 2) 
take a refund of his earnest money. In this case, Leucadia 
agreed to sell property located at a specific address in Summit 
County. Leucadia had good and marketable title to property 
located at that address. Leucadia erroneously believed and 
represented that the property contained a neighboring stream, 
pond, and spring. That fact should not cloud title to the 
property Leucadia actually owned. There is, therefore, no 
"defect" in Leucadia's title. £££_ Black's Law Dictionary 1332 
(5th ed. 1979) (defective title means unmarketable title). 
Clearly, where the contract has not provided a legal remedy, 
the trial court could order specific performance of the 
contract. 
Even where a legal remedy is provided, however, the trial 
court has the discretion to order specific performance of the 
contract if the legal remedy is inadequate. See generally 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 357-360 (1981). "The rule 
has been long established that a vendee has the right to insist 
upon performance by the vendor to the extent the latter is able 
to perform with an abatement in the purchase price equal to the 
value of the deficiency or defect." Castagno v. Church, 552 
P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1976); £££ fllfifl In re Havhurst's Estate. 
478 P.2d 343 (Okla. 1970); Streator v. White, 26 Wash, App. 
430, 613 P.2d 187 (1980). 
I believe the trial court had the discretion to order 
Leucadia to convey the property it owned with an abatement in 
the purchase price. Resolution of this appeal should turn not 
on the unavailability of specific performance as a remedy, but 
on whether Kelley made a proper and timely tender, as argued by 
the parties. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
KU^C 
EXHIBIT "C 
RESOLUTION 
Be It resolved by the Utah Real Estate Commission as 
follows: 
Whereas, the Utah Real Estate Commission has 
reviewed the decision of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, Case Number 880534-CA; and 
Whereas, the decision of the Court of Appeals in 
that case purports to give an interpretation of 
the standard form Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
which interpretation severely limits the rights 
of buyers to specific performance thereunder; and 
Whereas, the Standard form Earnest Money Sales 
Agreement is a form document approved by the Utah 
Real Estate Commission and the Attorney General 
for the State of Utah; and 
Whereas, the Utah Real Estate Commission is 
gravely concerned with the decision of the Court 
of Appeals as it relates to its Interpretation of 
the standard form Earnest Money Sales Agreement 
which form Is used by real estate salesagents 
throughout the State of Utah; and 
Whereas, it is in the best interest of the Real 
Estate Industry In the State of Utah that the 
Utah Supreme Court review the decision of the 
Utah Court of Appeals as it relates to Its 
interpretation of the standard form Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement limiting the rights of buyers to 
specific performance; and 
Now therefore, the Utah Real Estate Commission 
does hereby resolve that the Attorney General for 
the State of Utah be requested to take such 
action and file such papers as are necessary and 
appropriate to* obtain a review of the this 
decision by the Utah Supreme Court, and to allow 
the State of Utah to provide such input, and to 
assert its position regarding the interpretation 
and enforceability of the standard form Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement and the rights of buyers to 
obtain specific performance thereunder. 
in witness whereof the undersigned members of the 
Utah Real Estate Commission have set their hands 
on this 9th day of May, 1990. 
U/ILYP-/L /JOU^< 
Fredrick "Buck" Froerer, I 
Pau i Neufenschwander 
feeth T o l b e r t 
EXHIBIT "D 
State of Utah 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
Division of Real Estate 
HeoerM Weils Building 
160 East 300 South/P O Box 45802 
Sa't Lake Cay Uta^ 84145-0802 
(801)530-6747 
May 22, 1990 
David W. Lund, Esq. 
Attorney General's Office 
236 State Capitol 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
RE: Amicus brief 
Dear Mr. Lund: 
The Division of Real Estate hereby requests the Attorney General 
to file an amicus brief on behalf of the Division In Kelley v. 
Leucadla Financial Corp., Case No. 880534-CA (Utah App. 1990). We 
are concerned that the decision by the Court of Appeals In that 
case Is incorrect and will drastically alter the rights of buyers 
of real property in the State of Utah. 
The Court of Appeals decision was based on an Interpretation of 
one of the general provisions In the standard form Earnest Money 
Sales Agreement which all real estate licensees in Utah must use. 
The form contract was approved by the Attorney General and the 
Utah Real Estate Commission. The State therefore has a keen 
interest in the integrity of the contract. The Division believes 
that the Court of Appeals incorrectly interpreted one provision of 
the contract in isolation without regard to a number of other 
provisions in the contract. 
The result of this Interpretation is to limit the rights which a 
buyer of real property has upon default by the seller. 
Historically, buyers have had a number of remedies available to 
them when a seller fails to perform. Buyers have been able to sue 
for rescission of the contract, for money damages, or for specific 
performance of the contract. In the Ke11ey case, the Court of 
Appeals interpreted the language of the standard form contract to 
say that if a seller defaults because of a title problem, the 
buyer may not sue for specific performance. The Court stated that 
the buyer's only remedy is a return of his earnest money. 
Presumably the buyer could not sue for damages under the Court's 
interpretation of the contract. 
This decision moves Utah back toward the days of "buyer beware". 
If the buyer defaults, the seller may elect a number of remedies, 
Norman H. Bangerter 
Governor 
David L. Buhler 
Executive Director 
Blame E. Twitchell 
Including specific performance or suing the buyer for damages. 
Yet, if the seller defaults, the buyer would be limited to getting 
his earnest money back and walking away from the transaction. The 
effect of the Court of Appeals decision could be to dramatically 
shift the balance of rights in favor of sellers in real estate 
transact ions. 
It was not the Intent of either the committee which drafted the 
Earnest Money Sales Agreement or the Utah Real Estate Commission 
to limit the buyer's remedies. There was no discussion before 
either body about limiting the buyer to a refund of his earnest 
money if the seller defaulted because of a title problem. Quite 
the contrary, there was considerable discussion about making the 
contract one contract which evenly balanced seller's rights and 
buyer's rights and which would protect both parties equally. The 
provision upon which the Court of Appeals based its decision was 
put into the contract to protect buyers of real estate, but the 
court has interpreted that provision to give sellers an unfair 
advantage over buyers. 
The Division of Real Estate respectfully requests that the 
Attorney General file an amicus brief on its behalf in this case 
arguing that the Court of Appeals interpretation of the Earnest 
Money Sales Agreement is incorrect and against public policy 
Sincerely, 
DIVISION OF REAL ESTATE 
/Twi tche 1 I 
Di rector 
skwlet.ag 
